This paper investigates the formation of networks of family-owned business groups. We show that marriage of o¤spring can be used as a corporate strategy to establish family networks. We construct a detailed data set of newlyweds who are the o¤spring of bigbusiness families in Thailand covering the period from 1991 to 2006. We …nd positive abnormal returns when the wedding partner is from a politically and economically wellconnected family with the weddings associated with a three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 0.94% and 1.29%, respectively. In addition, we …nd that the choice of marriage is determined by the family business. O¤spring are more likely to choose their spouse from a well-connected family when the family's businesses are more diversi…ed, are in the property and construction industries, depend on government concessions and contracts, and have more leverage. The results suggest that family networks help to provide information and enforce contracts, thus reducing market frictions faced by …rms in emerging economies.
Introduction
Family …rms have recently received a lot of attention in the economic literature due to their prevalence around the world. Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) argue that business practice rests on family networks in developing economies mainly because of weak economic and legal institutions. So, …rms face a variety of uncertainties when transacting with other …rms, such as their trustworthiness. Family networks may help to provide information and enforce contracts, thus reducing those uncertainties. A growing body of literature shows that family ties indeed play an important role in shaping the business organization and its e¢ ciency (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, and Schoar, 2005; Perez-Gonzales, 2006; and Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzales, and Wolfenzon, 2007) . 1 We extend the literature by examining empirically the formation of business networks in family …rms. We focus on the "family" networks that are established via marriage of o¤spring. We hypothesize that the big-business owners use marriage to establish business networks. To test this hypothesis, we construct a detailed data set of newlyweds who are the o¤spring of big-business families in Thailand.
Family networks created by marriage have characteristics distinct from other types of ties. Marriage creates a strong and long-lasting bond that binds family members together.
Marriage not only creates networks but also consolidates and reinforces friendship and other social ties. Family networks, therefore, are …rm-value enhancing for several reasons. 2 First, the family is a stable institution that facilitates alignment, trust, and coordination among its members (e.g., Ban…eld, 1958; Fukuyama, 1995) . Second, via family networks, a family fortune can be enlarged and transferred. Family members often share various resources including …nances, human resources, input suppliers, contracts, reputations, other privileges, and markets (e.g., Khanna and Rivkin, 2006) .
We argue that family …rms can encourage sons and daughters to make strategic alliances.
We build the methodology based on the existing economic models of marriage to analyze 1 There is a large body of literature on the role of family ties in the business group context. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) provide an excellent review of the literature. 2 There are enormous studies in the sociology literature on the role of family networks in business, for example, Burt (1992) , Granovetter (1985 Granovetter ( , 2005 , Mizruchi (1996) , and Podolny (1994 Podolny ( , 2001 how marriages are formed. The marriage models describe marriage as an individual's search for a partner whom he or she regards as the most attractive according to his or her own preferences. We argue that if one is the child of a family that owns an extensive business empire, the marital selection is also presumably related to seeking a partner with assets and quali…cations that bene…t the family's business.
Our empirical analysis is based on an original data set that we construct from large family …rms in Thailand. This data set records the information on newlyweds who are the o¤spring of the top 150 business group families. Most of these families are of Chinese origin, and the founder has established a large business empire. Our data set is unique because it contains detailed information on newlyweds and their family trees. We go through 2,225 wedding announcements during 1991 -2006 and …nd 200 couples in which the bride and/or groom is a member of the top 150 families in our sample. We classify the newlyweds based on the partner's family background: whether or not he or she is from a well-connected family. We de…ne well-connected families as families associated with business and political networks. Out of the 200 newlyweds, 93 are connected to business networks and 66 to political networks.
We test whether the marital choice of o¤spring of big-business families is determined by family businesses. In the …rst analysis, we show that a new network established via marriage adds value to …rms owned by the newlyweds' families. The results on the stock market reaction to the wedding announcements indicate signi…cant positive abnormal returns. When the wedding partners are from well-connected families with the business and political networks, we observe a three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 0.94% and 1.29%, respectively. In contrast, when the marriage partner is not from a well-connected family, the family's …rms do not experience abnormal returns. The results suggest that marriage creates networks for the family …rms for economic advancement.
Next, we test whether marital choice is correlated with the …rm characteristics and family structure. We employ probit regressions in which the control variables are individual traits such as age, gender, education, and social background. Very interesting results emerge. We …nd that both family traits and business characteristics strongly in ‡uence marital decisions toward choosing a partner who is from a well-connected family. More speci…cally, we …nd that o¤spring are more likely to choose their spouse from a well-connected family when the family's businesses (1) are more diversi…ed, (2) are in the property and construction industries, (3) are based on government concessions and contracts, and (4) have more leverage. The results are consistent with the view that family networks facilitate information exchanges between families and …rms and that families in the same network share …nancial resources and government contracts. Our results also suggest that family connections are important in providing access to resources and contracts if the government plays a central role in an industry.
In addition, our results show that the Chinese-Thai family traditions and inheritance rules a¤ect the marital choice. O¤spring are more likely to marry a person from a wellconnected family if he or she is an heir, which we measure by whether he or she is (1) from the main family line or (2) a board member in group …rms.
Overall, our results suggest that the choice of spouse by o¤spring of big-business families appears to align with the family structure and its business interests. We think that our results go beyond Thailand to other Asian countries where business is often thought to be a family a¤air. Perhaps the most accurate picture of an Asian economy is a diagram of an extended family tree connecting clans, with dotted lines sometimes leading to the government similar to what we show in this study. 3 The Asian culture makes the bond via marriage strong because marriage is between two kin groups rather than two individuals.
Our paper is also related to recent literature measuring the economic role of family and family ties. This growing body of research shows that the organization of the family has important consequences for many economic decisions and attitudes, from participation in the labor force, home production, savings, geographical mobility to risk taking, trust, and social capital. For example, Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) , Bertrand and Schoar (2006) , and Alesina and Giuliano (2007) show that the strength of family ties a¤ects macroeconomic outcomes. La Ferrara (2003) shows that extended families substitute for absent credit markets in Africa.
2 Big-business owners in Thailand: Family, marriage, and business In this section, we describe family structure and marriage practices of wealthy families that own a business empire. The majority of these families are of Chinese origin, whose founders migrated to Thailand during the early twentieth century. So, in these families a combination of Chinese and Thai customs and norms is often used. There are some similarities between the two cultures, however. 4 The traditional Thai family has a hierarchy, and each member has his or her speci…c place based on age, gender, and rank within the family. Relationships are strictly de…ned and named with terms so precise that they reveal the relationship (such as parental, sibling, uncle, aunt, cousin), the relative age (younger, older), and side of the family (maternal or paternal). These terms are used more often in conversation than the person's given name.
These extended family members can expect help and security as long as they remain within the con…nes of this order.
Parents are involved in almost every aspect of an individual's life, such as education, career, and marriage decisions, and remain involved in his or her life after the marriage.
Like its in other East Asian countries, Thai children are educated from youth to respect and honour their parents as the most sacred people in their lives. This education results from the Thai belief that parents have done them the biggest favor possible by giving them life and raising them to adulthood. (This gratitude is called "Boon Khun.") Therefore, children should be grateful to their parents and must ful…ll the obligations of …lial piety. This means that they have to obey their parents, respect their wishes during their lifetime, and care for them when they get old. Breaking this rule is regarded as very bad and sinful. The Buddhist law of karma is in operation here -if one does a bad deed, it will always lead to a bad outcome.
If a young man wishes to marry a young girl, he has to become well acquainted with the whole family of the bride-to-be and get consent. His family often includes not only his parents and siblings but also grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The same practice 4 See Jin and Xu (2006) for social norms of families on mainland China. applies to the girl as well. A marriage without the family's blessing is likely to face enormous di¢ culties as the couple interacts with the family in future economic or domestic issues.
Only after obtaining consent from both families will the parents of the young man delegate a respected person to propose to the girl's parents for the hand of their daughter.
When both families agree on the wedding expenses and the "bride price", the date for the wedding is …xed. The bride price, in the form of gold, jewelry, money, or properties, will be made to the bride by parents of the groom. The bride's parents provide her dowry, which becomes the asset of the newlywed couple. Among many wealthy families, it is also customary for the groom's family to build the couple a house of their own near the family house. In the Chinese-Thai tradition, a woman marries not just her husband but his whole family as well.
In business, typically, as with family …rms elsewhere, top management succession is within extended families. So, both sons and daughters of the top business families are well educated, and some attend Western universities. The children often join the family …rms soon after graduation. Those whose father is the founder of a business group often hold a board position right away and soon rise to the executive level. While traditionally inheritance of control within families often follows genealogical lines, that is, control is passed from the founder to his sons, grandsons, and so on (e.g., Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, and Schoar, 2005) , recent practice includes daughters.
Divorce was traditionally considered to be socially unacceptable in Thailand. As in other countries, the attitude toward divorce has changed over time, however. According to Thailand's national statistics, the average rate of divorce was low, less than one per 1,000 in 
Conceptual framework
This section provides the conceptual and empirical background for analyzing the value of family networks and determinants of the marriage decision. We hypothesize that an individual from a big-business family does not choose a spouse only according to his own preferences. We seek to understand whether the family and its business in ‡uence his choice of whom to marry.
Related literature
The existing economic models of marriage imply it to be a matching process (Becker, 1973 (Becker, , 1974 (Becker, , 1981 . Women and men meet each other randomly and choose each other based on an observed and expected matching quality. Individuals marry when the bene…ts of being married are higher than the net bene…ts of remaining single. In other words, individuals try to maximize their future family income and social status by searching for what they regard as the most attractive partner. Sorting may stem from individuals' preferences or search frictions, that is, the time cost of meeting and getting to know prospective spouses.
An extensive number of studies in the literature show that women and men match along socioeconomic attributes such as income, ability, race, and education in addition to physical attractiveness (e.g., Burdett and Coles, 1997; Mare, 1991; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson, 2006; and Wong, 2003) .
Parents also have an enormous in ‡uence on their children's choice, attitudes, and behavior. Parents can teach and inspire their children. In the marriage context, an extensive literature in psychology and sociology argues that individuals are likely to choose partners similar to their opposite-sex parents (for reviews see Daly and Wilson, 1990 and Epstein and Guttman, 1984) . Economists have only recently become interested in parental in ‡uences on children's attitudes toward spouse selections. For example, Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) show that parents want to and are capable of transferring their religious faith to their children. The preference for exposing children to people of the same religious faith drives the marriage choice. Similarly, Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) show empirically that a man brought up by a working mother is more likely to marry a working wife.
The value of family networks and ties
Based on the economic literature of marital choice, we hypothesize that for those who belong to big-business families, their choice of whom to marry is not simply an individual matter.
In these families, o¤spring's choice of marriage may be subject to greater in ‡uence by their families. A young adult's tastes or attitudes are a¤ected by his or her family in such a way that he or she will choose a spouse who is aligned with the interests of the family as well as the family business. Parents can in ‡uence their children's choice of whom to marry in several ways both directly and indirectly. For example, parents educate the children from youth on their responsibility toward the family and the family's business. They may be involved in the actual search process. For example, they may have them socialize with people in the same business circle. If a son-preferred candidate is not perfectly aligned with the parents' preference, parents can reduce or deny his inheritance. This threat is serious because the parents control key resources. In other words, the authority of the parents is linked to the extent to which the children depend on them economically.
Business families have strong economic incentives to ensure that their o¤spring choose the right partner. Family traditions and inheritance rules might drive the success of family businesses (e.g., Redding, 1990; Jones and Rose, 1993; and Whyte (1996) ). To ensure the longevity of the family business, parents must convince the best and brightest of their large extended families to take up the reins of the business.
More importantly, sons and daughters can be used to build strategic alliances or networks between families on a secure and long-term basis (e.g., James, 2006) . We argue that family networks enhance …rm value in emerging economies with weak legal institutions. In this environment, a …rm faces a variety of uncertainty when dealing with other …rms. For example, there is a considerable risk about a project's product and technological outcomes, the ability of the management team, as well as, the trustworthiness of the trading partners.
The network and business group literature suggests that trust associated with family relationships may ease uncertainty more e¤ectively than partnerships of individuals for several reasons.
First, families interact frequently and intimately. Family networks therefore provide high-quality and reliable information, knowledge, and technology (e.g., Mcmillan and Woodru¤, 1999; Ingram and Simon, 2002) . Family ties also ensure community enforcement of contracts; the ties can broaden both the number of sanctioning parties and the menu of penalties for improper behavior. Family relationships, therefore, are characterized by higher levels of trust and empathy as well as reciprocity, which do not exist in relationships established for purely instrumental purposes (Granovetter, 1985) . Accordingly, family relationships in business are regarded as the next-best solution to imperfections in the …nancial markets and corporate governance (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003 and Caselli and Gennaioli, 2005) .
Second, speci…c family members are an important source of reputation capital in product, input, and political markets (e.g., Granovetter, 1985 and Greif, 1993) . Extensive studies indeed show that family connections help …rms gain access to various resources such as …nance and government contracts (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005) .
Third, via family networks, a family fortune can be enlarged and transferred. In other words, family members can have access to the family's pool of …nancing, human resources, input suppliers, contracts, and other privileges. Family networks thus help secure mutual interests, eliminate competition, and merge …rms. As suggested by the business group literature, business risk can also be shared by the whole extended family, a form of safety net (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005) .
In summary, we hypothesize that closely networked …rms gain better access to inputs, credit, human resources, technologies, contracts, and markets. So, establishing successful networks is one of a …rm's strategic decisions. One of the most important corporate strategies is to use marriage as a means of economic advancement.
Numerous anecdotal evidence supports our hypothesis that marriage is a key to family business success and hence provides strong economic motivation for a family to in ‡uence its o¤spring choices. For example, Ferguson (1998) argues that the House of Rothschild's success from the late eighteenth into the early twentieth century was due not only to the …nancial skills of the partners but also to their innovative strategies in the sphere of marriage and succession. The bank was organized by Mayer Amschel Rothschild, one of the founder's …ve sons, into …ve branches in …ve di¤erent countries. The ties between these branches were reinforced by repeated intermarriage among nephews and …rst or second cousins. Similarly, Ingram and Lifshcitz (2006) show that family ties led to a sharing of managerial ideas, technology, and human resources among leading shipbuilders on the Clyde River in the United Kingdom. This close collaboration helped them become the world most famous shipbuilders from the nineteenth into early twentieth century.
In Asia, where government decision making remains opaque, most laws are still passed without public hearings, and concessions continue to be granted without public scrutiny of their terms and conditions. Strong political connections are needed for access to government favors and deals as well as capital markets. An extensive number of studies show that …rms indeed bene…t from having connections in Thailand, China, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Korea. 6 Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2007) also show that, via such connections, big families can crowd out new entrants in Thailand.
Data

Database construction
We construct a data set of 200 weddings that were held during 1991 -2006. This sample includes weddings in which the bride or groom is an o¤spring of one of the top 150 richest business families in Thailand. Our data-collection process involves four phases.
In the …rst phase, we identify the top 150 richest families using the information from Brooker Group (2001) and Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2006) . To measure their wealth, we use the total assets of the companies that are ultimately owned by the family. To identify companies that are ultimately owned by the top 150 families, we focus on listed and nonlisted companies that are among the 2,000 largest companies ranked on total assets as of the end of 2000. A remark should be added at this point that we may underestimate the real value held by such families if they own smaller companies. The accounting and ownership information is obtained from two sources. The …rst source is the Business On Line (BOL) database. The BOL has a license from the Ministry of Commerce to reproduce the accounting and ownership information of all registered companies. Our second source of data is the Stock Exchange of Thailand databases, namely the I-SIM CD-ROM and the SETSMART online service.
We trace the ultimate owners of the …rms in the sample by using the standard approach suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) . A …rm is controlled by a family if the family owns more than 20% of the voting rights, taking into account the pyramidal structure. As it turns out, this requirement is not necessary because there are only a few cases in which a family own less than 20% of the voting rights. We treat all family members as well as companies ultimately owned by these members as a single shareholder. A shareholder, therefore, includes individuals with the same surname as well as families linked by marriage. Surnames can be used to trace family relationships because family names in Thailand are unique and only people belonging to a family may use that family's name. To obtain a family's wealth, we sum up the total assets of all …rms that are ultimately owned by the family.
The second phase consists of constructing family trees. For each family member, we collect information on his or her speci…c position in the family tree, gender, and birth order (de…ned as the rank of children within a speci…c marriage). We hand-collect the information to track the family relationships from various sources. The most important source is the cremation volumes that are published and distributed as gifts on the occasion of cremation ceremonies. The data from these booklets include the biography of the deceased. the names, gender, and date of birth of his or her parents, siblings, spouse(s), children, and grandchildren. Many booklets of the business group founder/leader (for example, Chot Lamsam, Chin Sophonpanich, and Thiam Chokwattana) include detailed genealogical diagrams of the family and their related families. We obtained these booklets from the cremation volume collection at the National Library of Thailand (which, according to its own rules, is to receive samples of every book published in the country).
Additional family tree information is obtained from Brooker Group (2001) and Sappaiboon (2000 Sappaiboon ( , 2001 . These books provide us with information on the family backgrounds of the top 100 families such as the names of the founder, his spouse, children, and siblings.
Finally, we collect additional information on families that own listed companies from the companies'annual report . This data source provides information on the family relationships between major shareholders and board members as well as the date of birth of members of the board.
In the third phase, we hand-collect the wedding information. The data source is the most popular local newspaper, Thairath, which publishes news on weddings of celebrities on page 4 almost every day. The news includes the names of the couples, their parents, the people who presided over the wedding, the wedding date, the venue, and pictures of the couple taken at the wedding reception with their parents and other important guests.
A wedding notice is usually published two days after the wedding took place. We retrieve the notices from January 1, 1991 until December 31, 2006 from the newspaper micro…lm collections at the National Library of Thailand. There are a total of 2,225 weddings. Then, we match the names of the wedded couples with the names of the members of the top 150 families.
In the …nal phase, we collect the personal information on newlywed couples. The date of birth is obtained from the family registration o¢ cial record available at the Department of Provincial Administration of the Ministry of the Interior. Education backgrounds are obtained from the listed company annual report (FM 56-1) and corporate websites. We complement these sources of information with Thai business newspapers and magazines websites. Table 1 observations. The year of …nancial crisis (1997) had the fewest (seven observations).
Event characteristics
In Table 2 , we classify the newlyweds based on the partner's background: whether or not he or she is from one of the "well-connected families". The well-connected families are de…ned as the families associated with business or political networks. The families in the business networks include (1) the top 150 business group families and (2) the business families that are not the top 150. Families with political networks are de…ned as (1) royal and noble families and (2) the families of politicians and high-ranking civil servants and military o¢ cers. Out of 200 newlyweds, we …nd 93 and 66 cases of marriage in which the partner is an o¤spring of the business and political networks, respectively.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here]
Market reactions to wedding news
In this section, we examine the stock return responses to wedding announcements We use an event-study methodology in order to measure the e¤ects of the weddings of o¤spring of big-business owners on their family business. If the wedding of the controlling family's o¤spring bene…ts the …rms in that it helps establish a new business network, we should observe signi…cant positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. On the other hand, if the wedding is irrelevant to the family's business or not important for the …rm's prospects, we should not observe any signi…cant change in market valuation around the event. We consider marriages in which partners are from either (1) business networks or (2) political networks as marriages may be instrumental in family-network building.
We follow the approach as described in Brown and Warner (1985) to calculate cumulative market-model abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date. Our analysis incorporates three sets of portfolios. We classify the …rms into each portfolio based on the family background of the o¤spring's bride/groom, whether she/he is from (1) business networks, (2) political networks, or (3) others. Hereafter, we call these portfolios business networks, political networks, and other families. We also investigate the overall e¤ect of marriage on all connected families by creating another portfolio, network marriage, which is de…ned as the business networks plus the political networks. The …rms in the business networks and political networks portfolios are classi…ed as networked …rms. The other families portfolio contains the …rms that belong to the newlywed family whose partner is not from a well-connected family and hence serves as a benchmark.
A remark is in order here. Because we investigate stock returns, only publicly traded …rms are included in the portfolios in the following analysis. Accordingly, we focus on 66 cases of marriage with business networks, 44 cases of marriage with political networks, and 30 cases of marriage with others. Daily prices and returns (dividend included) are obtained from Datastream.
In the event-study analysis, we de…ne the announcement date (t=0) as the …rst trading day the wedding news is published in the local newspaper, Thairath. Announcement-period abnormal returns are computed as a …rm's equity return minus a market-adjusted return and summed over the announcement period. To obtain OLS estimates of the market parameters, we regress a …rm's returns on market index returns during 200 trading-day windows from days -210 to -21 prior to each announcement date. As a proxy for the market index, we use the Stock Exchange of Thailand value-weighted market index.
The primary event windows are the two windows around the event date: the three-day period (-1, +1) and …ve-day period (-2, +2). The test statistic under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns is computed for each sample using the test statistics described in Brown and Warner (1985) . More speci…cally, the test statistic is the ratio of the average CAR to its standard error, estimated from the time-series of average abnormal returns. This test statistic accounts for cross-sectional dependence in abnormal returns. Table 3A reports the mean and median CARs of the portfolios. The conspicuous pattern in the table occurs on the days just around the announcement by the …rst two sets of …rms where the owner's o¤spring is married to a person from an economically and politically wellconnected family. These two portfolios have signi…cant positive average abnormal returns each trading day from day -1 through day +1 and day -2 to +2. The value being created by the wedding is statistically and economically signi…cant. The estimated three-day CAR and …ve-day CAR for the group whose o¤spring's partner is from the business networks is 0.94% and 1.31%, respectively. The value created by the wedding to the political networks is somewhat larger. The …rms that are linked via marriage to the political networks gain 1.29% and 1.88% in value from day -1 through day +1 and day -2 through +2, respectively.
To the contrary, the market does not react to the wedding announcement of an o¤spring whose partner is an unconnected family. The estimated CARs are not signi…cant at the conventional levels.
For robustness tests, we run OLS regressions using the abnormal returns as the dependent variables. We include three dummy variables indicating the marriage types in the regressions: business networks, political networks, and network marriages. In other words, we compare the abnormal returns of …rms connected to business and political networks with those of …rms that do not establish such connections. We introduce a set of variables controlling for …rm-speci…c characteristics. Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets.
Leverage is de…ned as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The ratio of EBIT to total assets captures the …rm's pro…tability e¤ect on market valuation. The control variables are measured at the end of the year when the wedding was held. To ensure that the results are not driven predominantly by industry membership, we include 6 industry dummy variables in the regressions. All regression models are estimated using the OLS method with standard errors clustered at the family level. The t-statistics computed using the clustered standard errors are, therefore, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and robust-to-inherent correlation in the long-run returns within a cluster. Table 3B are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those for the univariate tests. The estimated coe¢ cients on the three dummies are positive and strongly signi…cant at the 5% level for all regressions. The striking positive abnormal returns for the …rms that are linked to the business and political networks by marriage, and the lack of market reaction to the …rms controlled by the families whose o¤spring wed to an unconnected family, strongly support our hypothesis. Based on these results, it appears that the market interprets the marriage of an o¤spring of big-business families as an indication of economic bene…ts to networked …rms.
The regression results in
[Insert Table 3 here] 6 Family businesses/structure and marriage decisions
In this section we complement our analysis of value e¤ects by providing evidence on the e¤ect of family factors and family business on the marriage choice. More speci…cally, we investigate the hypothesis that o¤spring of top business families consider the bene…ts to their family business when deciding whom to marry. It should be noted that this argument does not disregard the a¤ection component. However, we argue that attraction and love do not operate arbitrarily. Rather, marital selection is related to seeking a partner with assets and quali…cations that maximize one's preferences, which include the future family income, among other things. In other words, marriage can be instrumental for achieving economic bene…ts.
Empirical speci…cation
We estimate the probability of choosing a partner from a well-connected family as a function of the family business and family traits. We use probit regressions which are controlled for personal and other attributes that may a¤ect the marriage choice. Our basic regression speci…cation is a linear probability model of the form:
where Network marriage is an indicator variable equal to one if the wedding partner is from a well-connected family and zero otherwise. Family business, Family structure, and Individual attribute are de…ned as follow.
Family business We relate a number of characteristics of a family's business to the choice of marriage. As discussed earlier, family networks may facilitate information exchanges between …rms. The bene…ts of such exchanges are greater for …rms whose operations are highly dependent on information, such as the property and construction and government contracting industries. In these industries, to get a business o¤ the ground, networking is an absolute necessity. For example, networks provide the information on the demand and supply of properties.
In addition, we apply political models of family …rms where speci…c family members present an important source of reputation capital in political markets (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000) . Interaction with government o¢ cials and key market players helps foster goodwill among di¤erent types of people. Also, government o¢ cials are the people who formulate development plans, control budgets, set the rules for contractors to enter and op-erate in the industry, examine credentials, authorize contracts, and pay the bills for services rendered. So, close relationships with public o¢ cials facilitates receiving lucrative contracts.
In addition, via such networks, big-business owners can manipulate the government to serve their interests.
Many anecdotes from Thailand support this argument. For example, big-business leaders often manage to in ‡uence government o¢ cials on the selection of a new road to be built, the route of that road, or a new construction project. 7 Bene…ts may also simply come from having access to o¢ cial information on new construction projects. Then a developer would buy properties around the area before such information is made public and property prices rise. 8 There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence in a slightly di¤erent context. Coordinating with other market players seems to play a prominent role in securing contracts with the government. Close relationships among market players facilitate such coordination. For example, contractors may collude by having an arrangement whereby they bid for particular projects but structure their bids so that each one of them in turn is the winning bidder.
In order to ensure that maximum bene…t is received from the collusion, the bids would be structured so that the winning bid, although the lowest, would still be signi…cantly higher than if there had been genuine open competition. This arrangement can be di¢ cult to detect, particularly when experienced contractors are aware of how to pitch a bid to ensure that it is not so excessively high as to arouse undue suspicion.
We proxy the preference for building business networks by the family business whether its business is (1) in the property and construction industries, (2) dependent on government concessions and contracts, (3) diversi…ed, and (4) highly leveraged. We use a dummy variable to indicate whether a family owns a business that is in the property and construction industries, dependent on government concessions and contracts, and diversi…ed. A family business is considered diversi…ed if its businesses are in more than two di¤erent SIC codes 7 For example, the SC Assets Plc. was recently accused of bene…ting from the a Cabinet resolution on July 4, 2003. This resolution approved a project building a new road from Ratchadapisek to RamIntra. The new road immediately increased the value of the property development project of SC Assets as it turned the plot with no access into a golden project (The Nation, September 26, 2006). Apparently, SC Assets was ultimately owned by the Shinnawatra family, whose group leader was the prime minister during that period.
8 There were allegations that in speculation of a new Bangkok airport to be constructed and opened in 2006, prominent developers with strong political connections had bought large plots of land surrounding the airport (The Nation, June 26, 2006). de…ned at a two-digit level. Extensive business networks may become more important in a more diversi…ed business group, as it needs to have access to the information on industry trends and market conditions. Highly leveraged groups have strong incentives to build networks for seeking access to new …nancing or stabling of their …nancing obligations. We measure leverage by the group total debt divided by total assets.
Family structure We test whether the structure of the families behind these business groups plays a prominent role in the marital choices of the o¤spring. As in Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, and Schoar (2005) and Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzales, and
Wolfenzon (2007), we look at the heirs. Since it is not common among Thai …rms to explicitly nominate an heir, we use a number of variables to proxy for heir candidates. The successor choices are in ‡uenced by the Chinese-Thai inheritance customs and the current trend in gender equality. Typically the oldest son is the natural heir of the main business. Other sons inherit control over other businesses. Daughters are also highly educated and have become more involved in top management in the family business in recent years. Therefore, we allow for more than one heir successor.
More speci…cally, we use the following two measures to measure heir candidates. First, main line, is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not one is from the main line of the family. We de…ne the main line as the direct family of the current head, which includes his children and his grandchildren. The head of a group is de…ned as the founder if the founder is still alive. Otherwise, the head is the CEO or chairman of the largest …rm of the family group …rms. So, based on this de…nition, we consider all the children of the current head as heir candidates and his grandchildren as the next-generation heir candidates. Second, board member, is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not one is on the board of family …rms in the year of the wedding.
One may argue that an o¤spring from big-business families may select his or her partner from the same social circle. To capture the "same circle" e¤ect, we use a dummy variable, business dynasty. Following Landes (2006) , business dynasty takes a value of one if the family has been in business for more than two generations (o¤spring are in the fourth or …fth generation) and zero otherwise.
Individual attributes Following the economic model of marriage, we control for the e¤ect of gender and age di¤erences between the bride and groom. We did not include di¤erences in education and races as suggested by the literature because there is no signi…cant variation in these two individual traits between the couples. More precisely, we use the bachelor degree as a cuto¤ and consider there to be a gap in the couple's education when the bride has a bachelor degree but the groom holds a lower degree and vice versa. The education di¤erence turns out to be zero, as all the brides and grooms have at least a bachelor degree.
Similarly, given that Thai society is relatively homogeneous, it is not necessary to control for di¤erences in ethnic and religious backgrounds.
The vector of control variables X ij includes other family business factors, namely size and pro…tability. Size is measured by the total assets of all …rms in the same group. Pro…tability is the group returns of assets, which is measured by the ratio of earning before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets.
Results
To understand the role of family on the marital choice, we …rst discuss the characteristics of the bride and/or groom who is an o¤spring of one of the top 150 families. Table 4 show the results. First, we break down the sample by gender. The results show that out of the 200 cohorts, 113 (or 56.5%) are male o¤spring and 87 (or 43.5%) are female o¤spring.
Second, on the relationship of the bride/groom to the current head of a business group, our results show that marriages are concentrated in the current head's sons/daughters (83 cases) and nephews/nieces (100 cases). The rests are marriages of the current head himself (1 case), his siblings (12 cases), his grandson/daughter (3 cases), and his grandnephew/niece (1 case).
Third, we count the number of newlyweds who are heir candidates of the family business.
We …nd that there are 84 marriages of o¤spring who are from the main line. In addition, in 37 marriages, the groom is the …rst son of the current head. Finally, we …nd 83 cases of which the bride/groom is holding a board position of family …rms when the wedding took place.
Next, we categorize the cohorts based on the family businesses and look at whether the wedding partner is from a well-connected family. Table 5 presents the percentage of cohorts in each category. As hypothesized, in almost all cases of weddings of o¤spring from the families whose businesses depend on information and business and political connections, the partner is from a well-connected family. Statistically, there are 43 out of 45 cohorts in the real estate and construction industries and 14 out of 15 cohorts in concession-based businesses.
In Table 6 , we run univariate tests comparing …rm characteristics of the business groups in which the o¤spring are married to connected and nonconnected families. The results show that the groups whose o¤spring are married to connected families have a higher debt ratio. Besides debt, there is no signi…cant di¤erence between these two groups in terms of size, pro…tability, and asset tangibility. Table 7 presents the probit results. We …nd a strong correlation between family business and family characteristics on the marital choice of the o¤spring of top business families. We observe an in ‡uence of the family business attributes on partner choice. The coe¢ cients on the three dummy variables indicating whether the family businesses are diversi…ed and depended on real estate and concession industries are strongly signi…cant at the 1% level.
In addition, we …nd evidence that o¤spring from more leveraged …rms are more likely to choose their partners from a well-connected family.
For the e¤ect of family attributes, which are measured by the variables main line, board member, and business dynasty, the results are positive. A two-tailed test on the signi…cance of the estimated coe¢ cients on the former two variables reveals that this e¤ect is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. The coe¢ cient on the board member, however, is weakly signi…cant. Lastly, we do not observe any e¤ects from gender, age di¤erence, group size, and pro…tability. 9 To provide further evidence on the determinants of marriage choice, we employ multinomial logistic models with di¤erent reference categories. The multinomial logit regression allows us to distinguish and derive simultaneous comparisons among the determinants of the three types of marriage: business networks, political networks, and others. We use a categorical dependent variable to indicate the three categories of marrying choices. The marriage to others is used as the comparison group. The results are in Table 8 . Column (1) analyzes the probability of "business networks" to "others" marriage. Column (2) contrasts the probability of "political networks" vs. "others" marriage.
The empirical …ndings are consistent with the following notions. First, on the e¤ect of family business, the real estate business is positively related to the two types of marriage, business networks and political networks. We observe di¤erences in the in ‡uence of family businesses on marriage choices between the business networks and political networks. The probability of choosing a partner from a business network family is positively related to whether or not a subject is from a diversi…ed business group. However, whether or not a subject is from a diversi…ed business group is unrelated to the marriage choice between political and nonconnected families. In addition, while family business in concession industries is positively related to choosing a partner from a political network family, such a business is unrelated to the choice of having a partner from a business family.
Second, on the in ‡uence of the family, the variables main line and business dynasty are positively related to the probability of choosing a partner from both business and political network families. We observe a di¤erence between marrying to a business or political network: when a subject is holding a board position when getting married, he/she prefers to choose a person from a business network.
[Insert Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8 here]
Conclusion
This paper investigates the marriage choices of o¤spring of top business families in Thailand.
We show that marriage can be used as a corporate strategy to bene…t a family's businesses.
The e¤ect of family networks on shaping the success of business has long been documented in the sociology and organizational studies literature. Economists'interest in family …rms, however, is still limited to the expropriation role of the controlling families. The lack of studies beyond such issues is surprising in lieu of the extensive evidence on the pervasiveness of family ownership around the world. A deeper understanding of various economic roles of families is essential for analyzing the e¤ect of families and their …rms on economic development.
A natural extension of our work will be to develop a data set to explore the longterm consequences of marriage to well-connected families. An empirical analysis identifying the channels through which family networks would bene…t a family's businesses would in particular be important. Table 3A The value of network marriages
This table reports the statistics of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the wedding announcement dates of the offspring who are members of the top 150 big-business families in Thailand. This analysis includes only publicly traded firms. The event date is defined as the first trading day after the news published in the Thairath newspaper. Network marriages are the weddings in which the partner is a member of the family related to business or political networks. Business networks are the weddings in which the partner is a member of (i) the top 150 big-business families, or (ii) other smaller business families. Political networks are the weddings in which the partner is a member of (i) royal or noble family, or (ii) politician, high-ranking military officer or civil servant family. Others are the weddings in which the partner is from nonconnected families. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Network marriages is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the partner is a member of the family related to political or business networks, and zero otherwise. Business networks is a dummy variable that take a value of one if the partner is a member of (i) the top 150 big-business families, or (ii) other smaller business families, and zero otherwise. Political networks is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the partner is a member of (i) royal or noble family, or (ii) politician, high-ranking military officer or civil servant family, and zero otherwise. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. EBIT/total assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with clustering at the family level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Network marriages By type of networks Property and construction is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the family business is related to property and construction, and zero otherwise. Diversified business group is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the family business is a diversified business group, and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Main line is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offspring is from the main line of the current head, and zero otherwise. Board member is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offspring is a board member of the family firms, and zero otherwise. Business dynasty is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the family has been in business for more than two generations, and zero otherwise. Male is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offspring is male, and zero otherwise. Age difference is the age difference of a couple. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/total assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics from heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors with clustering at the family level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) Table 8 Multinomial logit regressions of marital choice
This table reports multinomial logit estimates of the offspring's marital choice of whether to marry to a person from a well-connected family. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the partner is a member of the family related to political or business networks, and zero otherwise. Concession is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the family business is related to government concessions, and zero otherwise. Property and construction is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the family business is related to property and construction, and zero otherwise. Diversified business group is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the family business is a diversified business group, and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Main line is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offspring is from the main line of the current head, and zero otherwise. Board member is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offspring is a board member of the family firms, and zero otherwise. Business dynasty is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the family has been in business for more than two generations, and zero otherwise. Male is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offspring is male, and zero otherwise. Age difference is the age difference of a couple. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/total assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with clustering at the family level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
